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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-1023 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JUAN CARLOS DONE, 
    Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00601-001) 
District Judge:   Honorable Jose L. Linares 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2014 
 
Before:   McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 21, 2015) 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
__________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge.  
 Juan Carlos Done appeals the judgment of sentence that was imposed following 
his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 Done argues that the district court erred by: (i) denying the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea; (ii) failing to dismiss because of an alleged violation of his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial; and (iii) denying his severance motion.  Each claim is meritless. 
 A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
  We will reverse the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
only for abuse of discretion.2  We consider the following factors: “(1) whether the 
defendant asserts [his] innocence; (2) whether the government would be prejudiced by 
the withdrawal; and (3) the strength of the defendant’s reason to withdraw the plea.”3  
Done contends that the Government failed to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea. 
 The district court acknowledged Done’s assertion of innocence, but held that it 
lacked factual support.4  Accordingly, the court concluded that his claim of innocence 
was “an inadequate grounds upon which to premise a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.”5  
Done also argued that he “demonstrated a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty 
plea” because there was confusion regarding the underlying charges that he was pleading 
guilty to because of his counsel’s ineffective assistance.6  The district court also 
accurately and appropriately assessed the weight of Done’s claim and found that it was 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001). 
3 Id.   
4 App. 203. 
5 Id.   
6 Id. at 204.    
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insufficient to sustain his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.7  Given 
Done’s failure “either to make a showing of factual innocence or establish a sufficiently 
strong reason for withdrawing his guilty plea,” the court found it unnecessary to consider 
the prejudice the Government would suffer.8  We agree.  
  “A simple shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of punishment are 
not adequate reasons to force the government to incur the expense, difficulty and risk of 
trying a defendant, who has already acknowledged his guilt before the court.”9  Although 
Done now insists that the Rule 11 hearing was not sufficient to allow the district court to 
accept his plea, our examination of the transcript of that hearing convinces us to the 
contrary.  The record reflects an extensive colloquy between Done’s former attorney, 
Rosen, and the Government.10 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.11  
 B. Appellate Waiver  
                                              
7 Id. at 206.    
8 Id.   
9 United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999). 
10 App. 290. 
11 Done also argues that the Government breached the plea agreement when it attempted 
to deny the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Section 3E1.1(a).  However, Done overlooks the language of the 
plea agreement—specifically in Schedule A, paragraph 7, the Government stated that the 
two-point reduction was subject to an acceptance of responsibility that “continues 
through the date of sentencing.”  Supp. App. 7.  Done moved to withdraw his guilty plea 
prior to sentencing which prompted the Government to deny this two-point deduction.  
Ultimately, the district court did not accept the Government’s argument and kept Done’s 
total Guidelines offense level at 26.   
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 Done contends that the district court erred by refusing to dismiss the prosecution 
with prejudice based on an alleged speedy trial violation and by denying his motion for 
severance.  The Government correctly notes that these challenges are now barred by 
terms of the appellate waiver contained in Done’s plea agreement. 
The plea agreement provided: 
Juan C. Done knows that he has and, except as noted below in this 
paragraph, voluntarily waives, the right to file any appeal, any collateral 
attack, or any other writ or motion, including but not limited to an appeal 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which 
challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence 
falls within or below the Guidelines range that results from a total 
Guidelines offense level of 26.12   
  
As the Government correctly notes, if Done wanted to preserve these claims, he 
should have attempted to negotiate a conditional guilty plea rather than entering an 
unconditional guilty plea.13  Since the arguments Done is making are not jurisdictional, 
they were clearly swept aside by his unconditional plea.14  
II. 
 For the reasons expressed above, we will affirm the denial of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea and the sentence of the district court.  
 
 
                                              
12 Supp. App. 8. 
13 See Appellee’s Br. at 28 (citing United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) 
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).  
14 See United States v. Stevens, 487 f.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2007).  
 
